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3                        
OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
The Development Group, LLC and Parsons Road Development Group, Ltd.
(together, “Development Group”), own two adjacent parcels of land on Miller Farm in
Franklin Township, Pennsylvania.  The Franklin Township Board of Supervisors
rejected Development Group’s application for preliminary approval of its plan to develop
the Miller Farm parcels.  Development Group appealed the denial to the Court of
Common Pleas for Chester County and the Commonwealth Court; both courts affirmed
the Board of Supervisors’ decision.  As its appeal was pending in the Pennsylvania
courts, Development Group filed a complaint against the Board of Supervisors, the
Franklin Township Planning Commission, various individual members of those bodies
(the “Township Defendants”), and John S. Halsted, the Township Solicitor, in the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of its rights to
procedural due process, substantive due process and equal protection.  The District Court
resolved these claims by granting the Township Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
procedural due process and equal protection claims, Dev. Group, LLC v. Franklin Twp.
Bd. of Supervisors, 2003 WL 22358440, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2003), and granting
Halsted’s and the Township Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the
4substantive due process claim.  Dev. Group, LLC v. Franklin Twp. Bd. of Supervisors,
2004 WL 2812049, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2004).  
Development Group now appeals the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants on the substantive due process claim.  The District
Court concluded, in a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, that Development Group has
not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants’ actions violated
Development Group’s substantive due process rights.  We agree and will affirm.
To succeed on a substantive due process claim in the land use setting, a plaintiff
must allege and prove executive action that “shocks the conscience.”  United Artists
Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, Pa., 316 F.3d 392, 401 (3d Cir. 2003). 
Although “the meaning of this standard varies depending on the factual context,” id. at
400, it “encompasses ‘only the most egregious official conduct.’”  Id. (quoting County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)).  Under this demanding standard, we
have little difficulty upholding the District Court’s determination that none of the facts
advanced by Development Group in this case rises to the level of conscience-shocking
behavior.
Development Group’s claim is based on three purported examples of “conscience-
shocking” behavior by the Defendants: (1) self dealing by the Board in rezoning the
Miller Farm properties to benefit members of the Planning Commission; (2) attempted
bribery by Township officials who offered to give Development Group priority in future
On appeal, Development Group also points out that the Zoning Hearing Board set1
aside the ordinance that rezoned the Miller Farm parcels, but it fails to explain how this
fact alters the shock-the-conscience analysis.  We conclude that it does not, for “[a] bad
faith violation of state law remains only a violation of state law,” and does not, without
more, rise to the level of a substantive due process claim.  Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City
of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 1992), cited in United Artists, 316 F.3d at
402.  
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Township development projects if they would abandon the Miller Farm plans; and (3)
Halsted’s suggestion that the parties wait to negotiate until after the plans were rejected
to avoid application of the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act, 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 701 et seq.   1
We need not decide whether the type of self dealing that Development Group
asserts, if true, would shock the conscience because we agree with the District Court that
Development Group has proffered insufficient evidence to support its theory.  See id. at
*16.  Its assertions that the Board of Supervisors rezoned the Miller Farm property to
benefit members of the Planning Commission amount to no more than conjecture.  “Mere
speculation about the possibility of existence of such facts does not entitle [plaintiffs] to
go to trial.”  Sterling Nat’l Mortgage Co. v. Mortgage Corner, Inc., 97 F.3d 39, 45 (3d
Cir. 1996). 
As for Development Group’s claims of attempted bribery and violation of the
Pennsylvania Sunshine Act, we cannot discern anything conscience-shocking in the
behavior of which Development Group complains.  Rather, we interpret the Township’s
efforts to offer Development Group other development projects and Halsted’s proposal
that the parties should enter into settlement negotiations once the plans were rejected as
6reasonable attempts to resolve the dispute over the Miller Farm property.  Moreover, as
the District Court noted, there is no evidence that any of the Defendants actually did
anything illegal.  See Dev. Group, 2004 WL 2812049, at *17, 18 n.18.  We therefore
agree with the District Court that, “[e]ven when taken as a whole, Defendants’ conduct,
though harsh, was not so extreme as to shock the conscience.”  Dev. Group, 2004 WL
2812049, at *18.
Although it has set forth various ways in which it contends that the Township’s
actions shock the conscience, the essence of Development Group’s complaint appears to
be that the Township never intended to allow it to develop the Miller Farm property. 
Because its preliminary plans conformed to the applicable zoning scheme–“high density
residential” or “HDR”–Development Group claims that it was entitled to approval “by
right.”  However, the Court of Common Pleas and the Commonwealth Court held that
the Board of Supervisors acted within its rights and in accordance with Pennsylvania law
when it denied Development Group’s plans.
Our decision in United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington
makes clear that federal courts are not to be “cast in the role of a ‘zoning board of
appeals.’”  316 F.3d at 402 (quoting Creative Env’ts , Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822,
833 (1st Cir. 1982)).  “Land-use decisions are matters of local concern, and such disputes
should not be transformed into substantive due process claims based only on allegations
that government officials acted with ‘improper’ motives.”  Id.  Given the state courts’
7rulings upholding the local officials’ action and the strength of our previous
pronouncements on this issue, we have trouble understanding why the parties continue to
press what essentially amounts to an appeal from local zoning decisions in federal court.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Defendants’ actions shock the conscience, even when viewed in the
light most favorable to Development Group, and that Defendants are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.  We have considered all of the other arguments advanced by the
parties and conclude that no further discussion is necessary.  Accordingly, we will
AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
_____________________
